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Abstract—Strong physical unclonable function (PUF) is a
promising solution for device authentication in resource-
constrained applications but vulnerable to machine learning
attacks. In order to resist such attack, many defenses have
been proposed in recent years. However, these defenses incur
high hardware overhead, degenerate reliability and are ineffi-
cient against advanced machine learning attacks. In order to
address these issues, we propose a dynamic multi-key-selection
obfuscation for strong PUFs (DMOS-PUF) to resist machine
learning attacks. The basic idea is that several stable responses
are derived from the PUF itself and pre-stored as the obfuscation
keys in the testing phase, and then a true random number
generator is used to select any two keys to obfuscate challenges
and responses with simple XOR operations. When the number of
challenge-response pairs (CRPs) collected by the attacker exceeds
the given threshold, the obfuscation keys will be updated imme-
diately. In this way, machine learning attacks can be prevented
with extremely low hardware overhead. Experimental results
show that for a 64×64 Arbiter PUF, when 32 obfuscation keys
are used and even if 1 million CRPs are collected by attackers,
the prediction accuracies of Logistic regression, support vector
machines, artificial neural network, convolutional neural network
and covariance matrix adaptive evolutionary strategy are about
50% which is equivalent to the random guessing.
Index Terms—Physical Unclonable Function; Machine learn-
ing; Obfuscation; Authentication.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
Internet of things (IoT) is the network of physical devices,
vehicles, home appliances and other items embedded with
electronics, software, sensors, actuators, and the connectivity
enables these objects to connect and exchange data. According
to IHS forecast [?], the global installed IoT devices will
increase from 15.4 billion in 2015 to 30.7 billion in 2020, and
this number will reach 75.4 billion in 2025. With the rapid
development of IoT, security issues attracted much attention
and became particularly serious. In 2017, the IoT Security
Research Report [1] pointed out that the global total cost
of IoT security was 348 million dollars in 2016, reached
434 million dollars in 2017 and was estimated at about
547 million dollars in 2018. Security issues have govern
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the sustainable development of the IoT. Secret key storage
and device authentication are the two key technologies to
address IoT security issues. Traditional security mechanisms
store secret keys in electrically erasable programmable read-
only memory (EEPROM) or battery-backed non-volatile static
random access memory (SRAM), and implement information
encryption and authentication with cryptographic algorithms.
However, in many IoT applications, resources like CPU,
memory, and battery power are limited so that they cannot
afford the classic cryptographic security solutions. Therefore,
lightweight solutions for IoT security are urgent.
Physical unclonable function (PUF) is an alternative solu-
tion for low cost key generation and device authentication. It is
a physical entity that is embodied in a physical structure and
easy to manufacture and evaluate but practically impossible
to duplicate, even with the exact same manufacturing process
[2]. In the past decade, intensive study has focused on PUFs
and lots of PUF structures are proposed such as Arbiter PUF
[3]–[5], SRAM PUF [6] and ring oscillator (RO) PUF [7].
These PUFs can be classed into the strong PUF [4], [10], [13],
[29] and weak PUF [6], [7], [27], [28]. Weak PUFs exhibit
only a small number of challenge-response pairs (CRPs) which
can be used as a device unique key or seed for conventional
encryption systems. On the other hand, strong PUFs such as
Arbiter PUF can provide a huge number of unique CRPs,
which enables the strong PUFs suitable for lightweight device
authentication. However, current strong PUFs are vulnerable
to machine learning (ML) attacks that attackers can collect
a certain number of CRPs from the communication channel
to model (clone) the PUF structure [8]. For example, for a
64×64 Arbiter PUF, the predication accuracy of trained soft
model can reach up to 99.9% when 18050 pairs of CRPs are
used. The cloned soft PUF exhibits almost the same challenge-
response behavior as the hardware one.
B. Limitations of Prior Art
In order to resist ML attacks, many defenses are proposed
and can be roughly classed into structural non-linearization
and CRP obfuscation. Structural non-linearization methods
[3], [9], [10] are to implement the nonlinear mapping of CRPs
by designing the specific non-linearization PUF structures.
However, the vast majority of existing ML-resistant PUFs
reduce the reliability of responses largely and can be modeled
with high accuracy [8], [12]. CRP obfuscation methods [7],
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2[13]–[17] are to prevent ML attackers from collecting enough
effective CRPs to model PUF via obfuscating the mapping of
CRPs. However, current CRP obfuscation methods share sev-
eral weaknesses: 1) vulnerability to advanced ML attacks such
as CMA-ES [18], [19]; 2) prohibitively expensive obfuscation
structures such as hash functions; 3) reducing the reliability
of strong PUFs.
C. Our Contributions
To solve the limitations of prior art, this paper pro-
poses a universal low overhead dynamic multi-key-selection
obfuscation for strong PUFs (DMOS-PUF) without reducing
the reliability. In addition, the DMOS-based authentication
protocol is proposed. The main contributions of this paper are
as follows.
1) Universality. The DMOS proposed in this paper can be
used for all strong PUFs to resist ML attacks.
2) Low overhead. The DMOS just uses XOR logic, a true
random number generator (TRNG) and several stable
responses derived from the PUF itself to obfuscate the
mapping of CRPs, which incurs negligible hardware
overhead.
3) No effects on reliability. Challenges and responses are
obfuscated with the keys by bitwise XOR operation, and
the obfuscation keys are the stable CRPs derived from
the PUF. Therefore, the reliability of PUFs will not be
reduced.
4) High efficiency. We have evaluated five ML attacks
including Logistic regression (LR), support vector ma-
chines (SVM), artificial neural network (ANN), convo-
lutional neural network (CNN) and covariance matrix
adaptive evolutionary strategy (CMA-ES). The experi-
mental results show that the prediction accuracies are
about 50% even if 1 million CRPs are collected by
attackers when 32 keys are used.
5) Resist all ML attacks. The DMOS selects any two keys
randomly from the key set to obfuscate the map relation-
ship of CRPs. When the number of CRPs collected by
attackers exceeds the threshold we preset, the keys will
be updated immediately. In this way, DMOS is able to
resist existing ML attacks effectively.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Related work
is elaborated in Section II. Section III introduces some related
definitions, concepts and terminologies. Section IV gives a
detailed introduction about our proposed DMOS. Experimental
results and analysis are reported in Section V. In section VI,
we compare the DMOS with several recent proposed defenses.
Finally, a conclusion is made in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
In 2004, Lee et al. [4] demonstrated that the ML attack is
a great threat to strong PUFs for the first time. Later, several
ML attacks have been proposed to model various strong PUFs
[8], [12]. In order to resist such attack, many defenses have
been proposed in recent years. These defenses can be roughly
classed into structural non-linearization and CRP obfuscation.
A. Structural Non-linearization
Structural non-linearization is to implement nonlinear PUF
structures to obstruct the ML-based modeling. Feed forward
Arbiter PUF (FFA PUF) [3], current mirrors PUF [9] and
voltage transfer PUF [10] are typical non-linearization PUF
structures. In the FFA PUF structure, the racing results of the
previous multiplexer stages is feed forward to the following
one or more select lines (challenge bits), thus making the
Arbiter PUF structure non-linear. The current mirror PUF is
to transmit the current through identical non-linear current
mirrors, while voltage transfer PUF is to implement a non-
linear voltage transfer function. These non-linear PUF struc-
tures can resist traditional ML attacks such as LR effectively.
However, the reliability is reduced due to the non-linearization
of PUF structure. In addition, these non-linear PUF structures
are vulnerable to ES-based modeling attacks.
B. CRP Obfuscation
CRP obfuscation can hide the mapping of CRPs to prevent
attackers from collecting valid CRPs to model strong PUFs.
Some typical obfuscation methods have been proposed to
obfuscate challenges and/or responses with XOR gates, hash
functions and random bits.
1) XOR gates: XOR is a simple and efficient obfuscation
method against machine leaning attacks. Suh et al. [7] pro-
posed a XOR Arbiter PUF that the outputs of multiple parallel
Arbiter PUF structures are XORed together to generate 1-bit
more secure response. XOR Arbiter PUF improves the ability
of resisting machining learning because the mapping of CRPs
is obfuscated with the XOR gates at the expense of reduced
reliability and high hardware overhead. Wang et al. [11]
propose a feedback structure to XOR the PUF response with
the challenge, which ignores the reliability of PUF responses.
Majzoobi et al. proposed the lightweight secure PUF [13]
where complex challenge mapping that derives the individual
challenges from a global challenge is applied to multiple
parallel Arbiter PUF structures and then multiple individual
responses are XORed to produce a multi-bit response. Un-
fortunately, these XOR-based obfuscation methods have been
broken by SVMs and ES when the number of parallel PUFs
is no more than eight [8], [12], [22].
2) Hash functions: Controlled PUF [14] is to obfuscate
the mapping of CRPs with the hash function. Since both
challenges and responses are hashed, the real challenges and
responses can’t be accessed. However, the hash and error-
correction code (ECC) blocks introduce significant area and
power overhead, and the use of helper data will make the PUF
vulnerable to side-channel attacks [18], [22]. In order to reduce
overhead, Gao et al. [15] proposed a PUF-FSM obfuscation
method that removes the hash logic on challenges and replace
the ECC unit with FSM. However, the hash logic for responses
still incurs large overhead, and the PUF-FSM obfuscation has
been broken by the variant CMA-ES [19].
3) Random bits: Yu et al. proposed a lockdown technique
[24] which uses a query mechanism to restrict the number
of available CRPs for attackers to clone PUF. However, the
number of CRPs for authentication is limited. Majzoobi et al.
3TABLE I
LIST OF PARAMETERS.
Symbol Description
n Number of PUF stages
Cob The set of challenges used for obfuscation
Rob The set of responses used for obfuscation
K The set of keys used for obfuscation
Keyi A key in K used to XOR with PUF challenges
Keyj A key in K used to XOR with PUF responses
ŜPUF i The soft PUF model trained in enrollment phase
 The prediction error rate of soft PUF model
Nmin,
Minimum number of CRPs required for attackers
to build a PUF model with a prediction error rate 
ntolerance Maximum number of bit-flips allowed in a PUF response
τ
The authentication threshold used by the server to
compare the emulated response R′ from the server and
the received response R from the physical PUF
Psuc
The probability of successfully authenticating a legal
PUF-embedded device
nEER
The error threshold which makes the FAR and FRR
approximately equal
[16] proposed a Slender PUF that randomly selects a substring
of the response and fill it with a random binary string to ensure
that its length is the same as the full response, then the server
exploits a recovery method to match the substring selected
randomly and authenticate the legality. Ye et al. [17] proposed
a RPUF that randomizes challenges with a random number
generator (RNG) before inputting to the strong PUF to prevent
ML attacks. However, Slender PUF and RPUF are vulnerable
to advanced ML attacks such as CMA-ES [18], [19].
As discussed above, existing structural non-linearization
methods and the vast majority of CRP obfuscation methods
degenerate the reliability of PUFs. CRP obfuscation incurs
prohibitive overhead. Moreover, structural non-linearization
and CRP obfuscation are not completely immune to advanced
ML attacks. This paper proposes a low overhead dynamic
multi-key obfuscation technique to resist machine leaning
attacks without reducing the reliability.
III. PRELIMINARIES
This section will introduce some terminologies and concepts
used in this paper and some more detailed definitions will be
given when necessary. Throughout this paper, we employ the
symbols and terminology shown in Table I.
A. Notation
1) HD, FHD, mean HD
Hamming distance (HD). For the L-bit binary strings X
and Y, the HD between X and Y is defined as:
HD(X,Y ) =
L−1∑
i=0
X[i]⊕ Y [i] (1)
Fractional Hamming distance (FHD). The Fractional
Hamming distance between X and Y is defined as:
FHD(X,Y ) =
HD(X,Y )
L
(2)
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Fig. 1. The structure of original Arbiter PUF [4]
Mean of pairwise HD. Given a set C containing multiple
binary strings, the mean of pairwise HD of C is defined as:
meanHD(C) = mean{fHD(Ci, Cj)} (3)
where the binary strings Ci ∈ C, Cj ∈ C and i6=j.
2) Inter-HD, Intra-HD, Pˆ inter, Pˆ intra
Inter-HD and intra-HD are used to describe the statistical
characteristics of PUF responses. The definitions of inter-HD
and intra-HD are as follows.
Inter-HD. Inter-HD indicates the HD between the responses
generated by two different PUF instances when the same
challenge is input. Inter-HD is used to measure the uniqueness
of PUF.
Inter-HD = HD(R1;R2) (4)
where R1 and R2 are generated by any two different PUF
instances when inputting the same challenge.
Intra-HD. Intra-HD indicates the HD between the re-
sponses generated by the same PUF instance when the same
challenge is input. Intra-HD is used to measure the reliability
of PUF.
Intra-HD = HD(RX ;RY ) (5)
where RX and RY are generated by the same PUF instance
when inputting the same challenge in different environments.
Since both inter-HD and intra-HD distributions follow a
binomial distribution, B(n, pˆ), the binomial probability esti-
mator of inter-HD and intra-HD distributions are
Pˆinter = P{R1 6= R2} (6)
Pˆintra = P{RX 6= RY } (7)
where Pˆ inter is the probability of R1 6= R2, Pˆ intra is the
probability of RX 6= RY .
B. Strong PUFs
Strong PUFs can generate a large number of CRPs, scaling
exponentially with the required IC area [25]. Arbiter PUF [4],
lightweight secure PUF [13] and current mirror PUF [10] are
typical strong PUFs. Among them, Arbiter PUF [4] is the most
popular one.
The structure of original Arbiter PUF is shown in Fig.
1, two parallel n-stage multiplexer chains share the same
input, and the outputs are connected to a flip-flop’s D input
and clock input, respectively. A step input signal T is given
at the input side, and the selection side of the multiplexer
4chain forms the challenge input bits C1 ∼ Cn. The selection
signal Ci determines whether the step signals at the stage
i of the multiplexer chain are transmitted along the original
multiplexer chain or the step signals on the two parallel chains
are interchanged. The delay difference in the upper and lower
multiplexer chains determines whether the step signal will first
reach the D input or the clock input of the flip-flop, resulting
in logic 1 or logic 0 being latched respectively. The latched
value will be 1 bit for a response. This Arbiter PUF structure
only generates a 1-bit response for each challenge. However,
multi-bit responses are required in practical applications. There
are two ways to generate multi-bit responses. One is to use a
linear feedback shift register (LFSR) or a module with similar
function to extend the challenge which will be set as the seed
of the random number generator to generate multiple sub-
challenges. Then these sub-challenges will be input to the PUF
circuit one by one to generate multi-bit responses. Another
is to use multiple challenges input to the Arbiter PUF one
by one to get multiple bits response, but which incurs high
hardware overhead. This paper uses multiple challenges to
generate multi-bit responses.
The functionality of Arbiter PUF can be represented by an
additive linear delay model [8], [26], [31]. When modeling an
Arbiter PUF, the total delay of the signals is the cumulative
sum of the delay in each stage. In this model, we can define
the final delay difference ∆ between the upper and the lower
path as:
∆ = ~ωT ~φ (8)
where ~ω = {ω1, ω2, ..., ωn, ωn+1}, the dimensions of ~ω and
~φ are both n + 1; the eigenvector ~ω represents a function
with the n-bit challenge [8] [26] [31]. The parameter vector
~ω represents the delay of each stage in an Arbiter PUF; ω1
= (σ01 − σ11), ωi = (σ0i−1 + σ1i−1 + σ0i − σ1i ) , i = 2, 3, ..., n
and ωn+1 = (σ0n + σ
1
n)/2. σi
0upslope1 denotes the delay of the
multiplexer Mi, where σi1 means that the signal is crossed in
the Mi, while σi0 means uncrossed. In addition,
~φ(~C) = (φ1(~C), ..., φn(~C), 1)T (9)
where φl(~C) =
∏n
i=l(1− 2Ci), l = 1, ..., n.
The output of Arbiter PUF t is determined by the sign func-
tion acting on the total delay difference. And for convenience,
we replace t = 0 with t = −1:
t = sgn(∆) = sgn(~ωT ~φ) (10)
Eqn. (10) indicates that the vector ~ω determines a separate
hyperplane in all the eigenvectors by ~ωT ~φ = 0. When t = −1,
all eigenvectors are on one side of the hyperplane. Conversely,
when t = 1, all eigenvectors are on the other side. Hence, the
response of Arbiter PUF can be predicted by the obtained
hyperplane.
C. ML Attacks
1) Logistic Regression (LR)
LR [32] is a frequently used supervised ML method. When
LR is used to model the Arbiter PUF, each challenge C =
{C1, ...,Cn} is given a probability P(C, t|~ω ) that generates a
response t(t ∈ {−1, 1}). As a technical convention, t ∈ {0, 1}
is replaced by t ∈ {−1, 1}. Since the vector ~ω denotes the
delays of the subcomponents (stages) in the Arbiter PUF, the
probability P (C, t|~ω) is obtained by the logistic regression
sigmoid function acting on f(~ω):
P(C, t|~ω) = σ(tf) = σ(1 + e−tf )−1 (11)
For the training set M , the parameter vector ~ω is adjusted
to determine the decision boundary to minimize the negative-
likelihood:
~̂ω = argmin~ωl(M,~ω) = argmin~ω
∑
(C,t)∈M
−ln(σ(tf(~ω,C)))
(12)
As there is no suitable way to find the optimal ~ω directly,
the iterative method such as the gradient descent algorithm is
used to solve this problem:
∇l(M,~ω) =
∑
(C,t)∈M
t(σ(tf(~ω,C))− 1)∇f(~ω,C) (13)
We have tested several optimization methods including
standard gradient descent, iterative reweighted least squares
and Rprop [32] [33], where RProp gradient descent works best
in LR. The classification object of LR is not required to be
linearly separable, but the loss function must be differentiable.
2) Support Vector Machines (SVM)
SVM [32] can perform binary classification and solve the
classification tasks by mapping known training instances into
a higher-dimensional space. The goal of SVM training is to
find the most suitable separation hyperplane and solve the non-
linear classification tasks that cannot be linearly separated in
the original space. The separation hyperplane should keep the
maximum distance with all vectors of different classifications
as much as possible. The vector with the smallest distance
to the separation hyperplane is called the support vector.
The separation hyperplane is constructed by the two parallel
hyperplanes with support vectors of different classifications.
The distance between the hyperplanes is called the margin. The
key of constructing a good SVM is to maximize the margin
while minimizing classification errors and the whole process
is regulated by the regularization coefficient λ.
In well-trained SVMs, kernel functions are often used to
solve the problem of support vector selection and classi-
fication. There are three frequently-used kernel functions:
1) linear: K(w, z) = zTw (only solves linearly separa-
ble problems); 2) radial basis function (RBF): K(w, z) =
exp((−‖w − z||22)/σ2); 3) multi-layer perception (MLP):
K(w, z) = tanh(αzTw+ β). Training a good SVM classifier
always requires to adjust regularization coefficient λ, σ2 (RBF)
or (α, β) (MLP). In our experiments, we use the SVM with
RBF kernel function to model PUF.
3) Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)
CNN [34] has been used in image classification widely
and achieved great success in graphic recognition such as
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Fig. 2. CRPs data transformation and extension
handwritten digits [35], traffic signs [34]. CNN finds the asso-
ciation model between images and classifications by learning
the training set. CNN consists of an input and an output
layer, as well as multiple convolutional layers, pooling layers,
fully connected layers. When classifying a target, multiple
convolutional layers and pooling layers are required and they
are arranged alternately. Each neuron in the convolution layer
is connected to its input locally, and each connection is
assigned a weight value. The output value of the neuron is
calculated by the weighted sum of the corresponding local
inputs plus the biased value.
The advantage of CNN lies in the automatic extraction of
features from the original pixel to the final classification, which
helps to model PUF without understanding the characteristics
(delays) of the PUF. In order to model PUF with CNN, we
need to transform and extend the original training data (CRPs).
Taking a 4-stage Arbiter PUF for example (see Fig. 2a)), when
the original challenge C1C2C3C4 = 1011, the response is 1.
In the process of data transformation, the challenge C1 ∼ C4
are from right to left, ‘1’ indicates that the signal is on the
path to a1, and ‘-1’ indicates the path to the signal on a−1.
Therefore, in the training data, we use the path indicator (1 or
-1) instead of the challenge (0 or 1). It should be noted that X4
is always on the path to a1 and Y4 is always on the path to a−1.
As shown in Fig. 2(b), the dimension of transformed data is
changed from 1×4 to 2×4. Transformed data can make CNN
easier to find the mapping relationship between the challenge
and the path to establish the PUF model. However, since the
transformed data do not have a spatial association like the
image pixels, extracting them directly using a convolutional
layer may lose characteristics. Therefore, we need to further
expand the transformed data. As shown in Fig. 2(b), the 2×4
transformed data is further expanded to the 4×4 extended
data. Additionally, unlike CNN for image recognition, CNN
for modeling PUF is not applicable to convolved data after a
compression in pooling layers. Besides, since the pixel value
of the PUF is -1 or 1, we also need to adjust the sigmoid
layer to facilitate the processing of convolved data. In this
way, CNN can model the PUF instance more easily.
4) Artificial Neural Network (ANN)
ANN is a self-adaptive learning system composed of in-
terconnected computing nodes called neurons. A strong moti-
vation to use ANN is given by the universal approximation
theorem: a two-layer neural network containing a limited
number of hidden neurons can fit any function with high
accuracy [37].
The simplest neural network consists of a layer with several
neurons, called the single layer perceptron (SLP) [37]. For
each neuron, all input vectors are weighted, added, biased
and applied to an activation function to generate an output.
In the SLP training process, the neuron updates its weight
and bias based on the linear feedback function of the training
set prediction error. When prediction accuracy of the trained
model reaches the preset termination condition, e.g., the preset
number of iterations, the training process will be stopped.
SLP can only solve the problem which is linearly separable,
and non-linear problems require multi-layer ANNs. In our
experiments, we use a 3-layer ANN to model the PUF and
the activation function is sigmoid, where the first layer has 35
nodes, the second layer has 25 nodes, and the third layer has
25 nodes. In addition, the loss function of ANNs is adjusted by
the RProp iterative method due to its fast convergence speed.
The core parameters adjusted to build an accurate ANNs are
the number of layers, the number of neurons in each layer, the
activation function and the optimization algorithm.
5) Evolutionary Strategy (ES)
ES [20] is inspired by genetics and evolutionary theory. ES
is to generate different children randomly through the parent,
and retain the best performing child as the parent of the
next generation and then keep the cycle going. As the next
generation inherits the best genes of the previous generations,
species continue to evolve.
Since a PUF instance can be represented by the delay
vector ~ω, the goal of modeling PUF with ES is to find
the parameter vector ~ω as accurate as possible to simulate
the real PUF instance. The key idea is to generate different
PUF instances randomly and keep the most suitable PUF
instance as the parent of the next generation. Such process
will be repeated until the child PUF instance closest to the
real PUF is generated. In the next generation, child vectors
usually use most of the parent’s delay vectors and adopt a
few randomly mutated vectors. In the ES algorithm, the most
typical mutation method is to add a random Gaussian variable
N(0, σ) to each PUF instance.
The modeling accuracy is used to select the most suitable
child PUF instance in this paper, and the child with the highest
modeling accuracy rate will be considered most appropriate.
Specifically, assuming that R and R’ are the l responses gen-
erated by the physical PUF and the child PUF instance when
inputting the same challenges, respectively. The modeling
accuracy A can be obtained by calculating the average HD
between the two binary strings R and R’:
A = HD(R′, R)/l (14)
There are many variants of the ES algorithm. The main
differences between them are: 1) the number of parents kept in
each generation; 2) the way that children derive from the par-
ents; 3) the way to control the random mutation rate σ. There
are two general approaches to control σ. One is to reduce the
mutation rate σ deterministically, and the other is to make
6PUF
Register
Key1(R1)
Key2(R2)
Keym(Rm)
Keyi
໌log2mໍ-bit
TRNG
๨
[C]
...
཰
ཱ
ི
NVM
Cಬ
1010...10
0110...01
0111...10
Keyj ๨Rಬ
ཱི
(m2R1)
1 2
ˆ ˆ(R ,R )Rˆ
[C2][C1] [Cm]...
Fig. 3. The structure of dynamic multi-key obfuscation
the σ adjusted adaptively according to the current execution
performance of the evolutionary algorithm. In this paper, we
use the covariance matrix adaptive ES (CMA-ES) to evaluate
our proposed DMOS PUF and use the default parameters
in [20]. CMA-ES employs a reorganization approach where
a child instance relies on multiple parent instances. CMA-
ES also uses the self-adaptation, i.e., the mutation rate σ is
not controlled deterministically but adapts itself automatically
depending on how the ES algorithm performs. CMA-ES has
better performance than original ES in modeling PUFs.
IV. THE PROPOSED DYNAMIC MULTI-KEY-SELECTION
OBFUSCATION
The modeling accuracy is related to the number of CRPs
collected by attackers and the complexity of the mapping
relationship of the challenge and response. Generally, the more
complex the mapping relationship is and the less the number
of CRPs collected, the lower the modeling accuracy will be.
Our goal is to complicate the mapping relationship of the
challenge and response and limit the number of CRPs collected
by attackers to resist modeling attacks. This paper proposes a
universal dynamic multi-key obfuscation structure that uses
the PUF’s own multiple stable responses generated as the
obfuscation keys, and then two keys will be selected randomly
from them by a TRNG to XOR the strong PUF’s challenge and
response. Furthermore, the dynamic key-updating mechanism
will update the obfuscated keys when the number of CRPs
collected by the attacker reaches the preset threshold. In this
way, ML attacks can be prevented efficiently. As shown in
Fig. 3, the structure of dynamic multi-key obfuscation consists
of the XOR logic, TRNG, non-volatile memory (NVM) and
registers. The concrete working principle of DMOS is as
follows.
First, some stable CRPs for the PUF are collected by testing,
then m × n CRPs are selected from these stable CRPs, and
their challenges are stored in the non-volatile memory on
the chip. Second, the stored challenges are input to the PUF
circuit one by one, and the generated responses are used
as the obfuscation key set which will be temporarily stored
in registers. Third, the server generates a challenge set (n
challenges) randomly and send them to the PUF chip, and then
the TRNG will select two keys randomly from the registers
to XOR with all these challenges and response of the PUF,
respectively. Finally, the obfuscated response will be sent to
the server for authentication.
In the DMOS, both the challenges and response are ob-
fuscated to get the best ability to resist machine leaning. In
addition, since challenges and response are obfuscated with
the key by bitwise XOR operation, the stability will not
be affected. Therefore, the DMOS can not only resist ML
attacks effectively, but also address the issue that the reliability
of PUFs is declined in structural non-linearization methods
and CRP obfuscation methods. The process of DMOS-based
device authentication includes the device-side obfuscation and
the server-side authentication.
A. Device-side Obfuscation
Device-side obfuscation includes the preparation phase and
the obfuscation phase.
1) Preparation phase: After the PUF is manufactured,
m × n stable CRPs CRob = {Cob, Rob} =
{[(C11, C12, ..., C1n], R1), ([C21, C22, ..., C2n], R2), ...,
([Cm1, Cm2, ..., Cmn], Rm)} are selected during testing,
where Cob contains n challenges and all challenges and Rob
are n-bit. Cob is stored in the NVM on the chip and CRob is
stored on the server.
2) Obfuscation phase: The server generates a random
challenge set [C] (C1, C2, ..., Cn), at the same time, the server
calculates all possible responses by the parametric PUF model
and the stored CRob, and all the responses generated will be
split into two parts R1 and R2. Then, the server sends the
challenges and all R1 to the device for authentication. The
DMOS selects a key Keyi from the registers according to
a random number generated by the TRNG. Then the set C’
generated by XORing [C] with Keyi is input to the PUF circuit
one by one as the real challenges to generate the response R’.
Finally, another key Keyj will be selected from the registers
randomly to perform XOR operation with R’, and the new
generated Rˆ which is split into two parts Rˆ1 and Rˆ2 will be
generated. If there is a R1 that matches with Rˆ1, the Rˆ2 will
be sent to the server for authentication. In this process, the
real challenge C’ can be expressed as:
C ′ = Keyi ⊕ [C] = f([Ci])⊕ [C] (15)
The response R’ and Rˆ can be expressed as:
R′ = f(C ′) = f(f([Ci])⊕ [C]) (16)
Rˆ = Keyj ⊕R′ = f([Cj ])⊕ f(f([Ci])⊕ [C]) (17)
When Rˆ2 is sent back to the server, the server will verify
whether there is a R2 that can match with it. If it exists, the
device is legal, otherwise, the device is illegal.
For example, for a 64×64 DMOS PUF (n = 64), assume
that the number of obfuscated keys in the set K is 8 and the
server sends the challenge [C] = [1010...11, 1110...00, ... ,
0110...10], to the PUF chip for authentication. If the TRNG
chooses Keyi = 0110...01 and Keyj = 1010...10 to XOR
with the challenge and response respectively. At this moment,
C will be XORed with Keyi to generate C ′ = [1010...11,
71110...00, ... , 0110...10] ⊕ (0110...01) = [1100...10, 1000...01,
... , 0000...11] which are input to the PUF circuit to gen-
erate R′ = f(C ′) = f([1100...10, 1000...01, ..., 0000...11]).
Then the response Rˆ = (Keyj ⊕ R′) = ((1010...10) ⊕
f([1100...10, 1000...01, ..., 0000...11])) is generated by XOR-
ing R′ with Keyj and Rˆ will be split into Rˆ1 and Rˆ2
for authentication. Finally, in the device side, if the Rˆ1
passes authentication, the Rˆ2 will be sent to the server for
authentication.
B. Server-side Authentication
On the server side, we use the PUF parametric model
ŜPUF i to generate R1 and R2 for matching authentication.
Compared with the traditional authentication method that
stores all CRPs in database [7], [25], the use of parametric
model can reduce storage overhead greatly and improve the
efficiency of server authentication. The whole authentication
process on the server side is shown in Fig. 4.
1) Enrollment phase: For a Devicei, the device identifier
idi is stored on the one-time programmable storage (OPT-S)
through the e-fuse technology. At the same time, we build
an accurate PUF parametric model ŜPUF i with the original
CRPs and store the model parameters on the server securely.
2) Authentication phase: First, the device identifier idi
will be sent from the device to the server. Second, the server
will compare the sizes of Counteri and Nmin, which is the
minimum number of CRPs needed to build a model with an
error rate . If the value of Counteri reaches the threshold
Nmin,, the server sends a key update command to the device
(ID = idi) to update the key set K on the PUF chip. When the
server issues a deterministic challenge set [C] and obtains m2
responses which will be split into two parts R1 and R2, the
server sends the [C] and m2 R1 to the device according to the
authentication record and updates the CRP counter Counteri.
In this way, it can not only prevent attackers from using the
already used CRPs to conduct replay attacks [25], but also can
update the keys to enhance the ability to resist ML attacks
according to the recorded Counteri.
In each authentication event, first, when the server receives
the device identifier idi, it will generate a unused challenge set
[C] and compute the m C ′ by XORing [C] with the m keys,
respectively. Second, the m C ′ will be input sequentially to the
parametric model ŜPUF i to generate m R′i. Then the m
2 R
will be generated by XORing R′i with the m keys respectively
and all m2 R will be split into two parts R1 and R2. After
that, the server will send the challenge set [C] and m2 R1
to the device. On the device side, [C] is input to the PUF
chip to generate an n-bit obfuscated response Rˆ which will
be split into two parts Rˆ1 and Rˆ2, too. In the device side, if
there is FHD(Rˆ1, R1) ≤ τ , the Rˆ2 will be sent to the server
for authentication. At last, the server will compare each R2
with the received Rˆ2. For the m2 possible R2 that may be
generated, if there is FHD(Rˆ2, R2) ≤ τ , the authentication is
successful, otherwise it fails.
C. Dynamic Key-updating Mechanism
We propose a dynamic key-updating mechanism for DMOS
to prevent against all potential ML attacks. In this mechanism,
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Fig. 4. DMOS PUF-based authentication protocol
when the number of CRPs collected by attackers reaches the
minimum number of CRPs required for attackers to build a
PUF model with an error rate , the server will update the
key set K. Based on theoretical considerations (dimension
of the feature space, Vapnik-Chervonenkis dimension), it is
suggested in [8] that the minimal number of CRPs which is
necessary to model a N -stage delay based Arbiter PUF with
a misclassification rate  can be expressed as:
NArbitermin, ≈
n+ 1
2
(18)
According to Eqn. (18), to model a 64-stage Arbiter PUF
with the prediction accuracy 95%, the minimum number of
CRPs required for attacks is NArbiterCRP,0.05 ≈ 650. However, for
the DMOS Arbiter PUF, when m keys are set for obfuscation,
m2 CRPs can be generated for each authentication. Therefore,
if attackers want to build a model for the DMOS Arbiter PUF
with an error rate , the minimum number of CRPs needed to
be collected can be expressed as:
NDMOSmin, ≈ m2 ×NArbitermin, ≈ m2 ×
n+ 1
2
(19)
In this case, the probability that the attacker extracts valid
NArbitermin, CRPs from N
DMOS
min, CRPs will be :
Pext =
m2
C
NArbitermin,
NDMOSmin,
(20)
According to Eqn. (20), for a 64-stage DMOS Arbiter PUF,
when m = 2 and  = 5%, NDMOSmin, is 2600 which is much
bigger than 650 (the minimum number of CRPs required for
attackers to build the model for the original 64-stage Arbiter
PUF). The probability that the attacker extracts valid 650 CRPs
from 2600 CRPs is 10−630. In addition, when the number of
CRPs collected by the attacker reaches NDMOSmin, , the server
will send the key update command to the device to update the
K on the PUF chip and server simultaneously. In this way,
DMOS PUF can resist all potential ML attacks.
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We propose a dynamic key-updating mechanism for DMOS
to prevent against ML attacks. In this mechanism, when the
number of CRPs collected by attackers reaches the minimum
number of CRPs required for attackers to build a PUF model
with an error rate , the server will update the key set K.Based
on theoretical considerations (dimension of the feature space,
Vapnik-Chervonenkis dimension), it is suggested in [8] that
the minimal number of CRPs which is necessary to model a
N -stage delay based Arbiter PUF with a misclassification rate
of  can be expressed as:
τ =
ntolerance
n
(21)
where ntolerance denotes the maximum number of bit-flips
allowed by the PUF response when the server matches, and
the response whose number of bit-flips are not greater than
ntolerance can be authenticated successfully.
If τ is set to be greater than ntolerance/n, the authentication
speed of the PUF responses will be faster. If τ is set to
be less than ntolerance/n, the authentication speed will be
slow. Therefore, the server can set τ flexibly to meet the re-
quirements of application scenarios such as the authentication
time and the security level. If the application scenario has
the high requirement on the authentication efficiency, the τ
can be set to be greater than ntolerance/n; if the application
scenario focuses on the security level, the τ can be set less
than ntolerance/n.
The probability of successfully authenticating a legal PUF-
embedded device can be estimated as:
Psuc =
ntolerance∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
× (1− pˆintra)n−i × (pˆintra)i (22)
where pˆintra is the binomial probability estimator of intra-
HD distributions of the strong PUF. In order to clone a PUF
successfully, the prediction accuracy of the cloned PUF model
should be higher than 1 − pˆintra. For a 64×64 Arbiter PUF,
Psuc is about 99.9% when ntolerance = 10 and pˆintra = 5%
which is measured in the worst case for the Arbiter PUF
[26]. Therefore, legitimate devices have an extremely high
probability of passing authentication by setting a reasonable
threshold τ .
E. Security Analysis
1) Brute force attacks: To build a model with the accuracy
1 − , attackers need to create a new model based on the
previous models for all possible responses generated by the
challenge. Therefore, the number of models that attackers need
to build to pass the authentication can be estimated by:
Nmodel = (m)
2NArbitermin, (23)
For example, when two keys are used to obfuscate, to model
a 64-stage Arbiter PUF with the error rate 5%, the number of
models that attackers need to build will be as high as 4650.
Therefore, it is impossible for attackers to clone the DMOS
PUF by brute-force attacks.
2) Replacement attacks: In DMOS, TRNG is used to select
two keys randomly from the key set K to XOR with [C] and
R, respectively. Therefore, for the challenge set [C], DMOS
PUF may generate m2 R. However, if attackers replace all
challenges in NVM with the identical challenge, then the
TRNG will always choose the same key to participate in
obfuscation, which will form a fixed mapping relationship
between [C] and R. In this case, the obfuscation ability of
DMOS will be reduced. Therefore, to prevent the replacement
attack, we need to ensure that both the average FHD of keys
in the set K and the ratio of ‘1’ in each key are close to 50%.
Therefore, we added a FHD detection module which consists
of XOR gates and an adder to detect whether Cob was replaced
by setting an average FHD threshold θ. If the average FHD
of Cob in NVM is less than θ (θ is slightly less than 50%),
the system will judge that Cob has been replaced and raise an
alert.
3) Probing attacks: The metal wires of the DMOS used to
generate the delay to determine the response can be attached
to the upper and lower paths of the strong PUF. Therefore,
once the attacker physically detects the internal structure of
the DMOS PUF, the response generated by the PUF would be
changed [14] and the entire DMOS PUF structure would be
destroyed.
4) Reliability-based modeling attacks: Unlike previous ML
attacks, recent reliability-based modeling attacks [19] do not
require the concrete knowledge of the response for a given
challenge but the binary reliability of the generated response
from the challenge. With the reliability information of CRPs,
attackers can design the fitness function for CMA-ES to model
PUF successfully. If attackers replace all Cob in NVM with
the identical challenge, then input the [C] (see Fig. 3) to the
DMOS PUF repeatedly and observe reliability information
of the response, fine grained reliable information of the [C]
would be given away to facilitate the reliability-based mod-
elling attack. However, if attackers replace Cob with the same
challenge in the NVM, the authentication will be cancelled
due to the presence of FHD detection module in DMOS. In
this case, even if attackers know the reliability information of
the challenge, the reliability-based modeling attacks cannot be
conducted successfully since they do not know which response
is corresponding to the input challenge. If the attacker matches
challenge and response by guessing, as analyzed in Section
IV.C, for a 64-stage DMOS Arbiter PUF, when the number of
keys is 2 and the prediction error rate is 5%, the probability
that the attacker extracts valid 650 CRPs from 2600 CRPs is
extremely low (about 10−630).
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. Experimental Setup
The proposed DMOS in this paper is a universal obfuscation
architecture that can be used for any strong PUFs, we choose
the Arbiter PUF to evaluate its resistance to ML attacks. We
have collected 1 million CRPs for Arbiter PUF and DMOS
Arbiter PUF on a Xilinx Artix-7 FPGA. All experiments are
conducted on the Intel i5-7400 CPU@3.0 GHz, GTX1050
GPU and 8G memory.
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CRPs
Fig. 6. Modeling accuracies on the 64×64 DMOS Arbiter PUF with 8 keys
using 1 million CRPs
B. Resistance to ML attacks
We adopt the adversary model used for the Arbiter PUF.
We model the original Arbiter PUF and DMOS Arbiter PUF
with five ML methods, LR, SVM, ANN, CNN, and CMA-ES.
In the experiments, we use the LR with the iterative function
Rprop [33], the SVM with the kernel function RBF [38], a 3-
layer ANNs, a CNN containing two convolution layers and two
connection layers and the CMA-ES whose the fitness function
is average Hamming distance to conduct ML attacks. In the
model training, we divide the CRP data set into the training
set (70%), validation set (20%) and test set (10%) randomly.
All trained models will be tested by 10,000 unused CRPs. The
experimental results are shown in figures 5, 6, 7.
As shown in Fig. 5, without any protection strategies for
the PUF, the modeling accuracy of the five ML attacks can
reach 95% when 50,000 CRPs are collected, which shows that
when a small number of valid CRPs are collected, attackers
can clone the Arbiter PUF successfully because the average bit
flip rate for a 64-stage Arbiter PUF is about 4.8%. However,
when the DMOS is deployed for the Arbiter PUF, attackers
are difficult to clone it. For example, as shown in Fig. 6, when
the number of keys in the set K is set to 8, even if the K is not
updated dynamically, compared with the original Arbiter PUF,
the modeling accuracies of the five ML methods are reduced
significantly. We have tested the effectiveness of the five ML
algorithms on a 64-stage DMOS Arbiter PUF. Experimental
results show that even if 1 million CRPs are collected, the
accuracies are lower than 55%.
We have evaluated the modeling accuracies of five ML
methods on the 64 × 64 DMOS Arbiter PUF with different
Fig. 7. Modeling accuracies on the 64×64 DMOS Arbiter PUF with different
numbers of keys using 1 million CRPs
Fig. 8. Distributions of intra-HD and inter-HD for the 64-bit responses
numbers of keys using 1 million CRPs. Fig. 7 shows that the
modeling accuracies of LR, SVM, ANN, CNN and CMA-
ES decrease significantly with the number of keys increasing.
For example, when the number of keys is 2, the modeling
accuracies are lower than 65%; when the number of keys
is 8, the modeling accuracies are lower than 60%; when the
number of keys is 16, the modeling accuracies are lower than
55%. When the number of keys is 32, the modeling accuracies
are close to 50% which is equivalent to the random guessing.
Therefore, DMOS PUF is able to resist ML attacks effectively.
In addition, since LR performs best in terms of modeling
time and modeling accuracy in five modeling attack methods,
we use LR to model the 64-stage DMOS Arbiter PUF with 32,
64 and 128-stage to evaluate the effectiveness of resistance to
ML attacks. The experimental results are shown in Table II.
For the original Arbiter PUFs, the modeling accuracy is about
95% when collecting 10,000 CRPs. However, for the DMOS
Arbiter PUF, the modeling accuracy is lower than 65% when
the number of keys is 2 and 100,000 CRPs are collected; the
modeling accuracy is lower than 60% when the number of
keys is 4; the modeling accuracy is lower than 55% when the
number of keys is 8. Therefore, the DMOS Arbiter PUF can
resist ML attacks efficiently.
Finally, the DMOS PUF can update the obfuscation keys
dynamically to improve the ability to resist modeling attacks
greatly. Once the number of CRPs collected by attackers
reaches the threshold NDMOSmin, , the server will send a key
update command to update the keys on the PUF chip and
server synchronously. With the dynamic key updating, the
DMOS PUF can resist all potential ML attacks.
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TABLE II
MODELING ACCURACY OF LR ALGORITHM ON ARBITER PUFS AND DMOS ARBITER PUF WITH 32, 64 AND 128 STAGES
PUF
category
Number of
challenge bits
Number of
response bits
Number of CRPs
in training Set
Number of CRPs
in testing set
Number
of keys
Prediction
accuracy
Original Arbiter PUF
32 32 1 ×104 1× 104 N/A 95.0%
64 64 1 ×104 1× 104 N/A 95.2%
128 128 1 ×104 1× 104 N/A 94.8%
DMOS Arbiter PUF
2 63.61%
32 32 1× 105 1× 104 4 57.35%
8 52.82%
2 63.61%
64 64 1 ×105 1× 104 4 57.34%
8 53.79%
2 61.93%
128 128 1 ×105 1× 104 4 55.93%
8 52.56%
C. Authentication Capability
Fig. 8 shows an example of the estimated inter-HD and
intra-HD distribution of a 64 × 64 Arbiter PUF’s responses.
The process by which we computed these estimators guaran-
tees that the assumed binomial distributions provide an accu-
rate estimation, in particular for the right tail of the intra-HD
distribution and for the left tail of the inter-HD distribution,
because these two tails describe two undesirable errors in an
authentication application: the false acceptance rate (FAR) and
the false rejection rate (FRR). The authentication capability
of PUF can be evaluated with the FAR and the FRR. Given
an n-bit response, FAR denotes the probability of incorrectly
accept an unauthorized device. Obviously, high FAR will bring
security vulnerabilities in authentication. False rejection rate
(FRR) denotes the probability of rejecting an authorized de-
vice. High FRR would result in low successful authentication
rate for authorized devices. When a n-bit response is used
for authentication, we can conduct a quantitative analysis for
the FAR and FRR which are determined by the uniqueness,
reliability and ntolerance [25], [26].
1) Uniqueness and FAR
Uniqueness is used to evaluate the difference in responses
generated by different PUFs when inputting the same chal-
lenge. The paper evaluates the PUF uniqueness with the
average Hamming distances:
U =
2
s(s+ 1)
s−1∑
u=1
s∑
v=u+1
FHD(Ra, Rb) (24)
where s represents the number of PUF instances, Ra and Rb
are two n-bit responses generated by two PUF instances u
and v when inputting the same challenge. The ideal value for
uniqueness is 50%.
For a n× n DMOS Arbiter PUF, FAR can be expressed as
[26]:
FAR(ntolerance) =
ntolerance∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(pˆinter)
i(1− pˆinter)n−i
(25)
where ntolerance is the number of flip-flop bits allowed
in a response when the server matches. pˆinter denotes the
probability of Ra 6= Rb. Since the DMOS Arbiter PUF uses
the multiple challenges to generate n-bit response from one
Arbiter PUF, the probability of Ra 6= Rb is actually the rate
of different bits in two responses. Therefore, pˆinter is equal
to the uniqueness of the DMOS Arbiter PUF.
We selected 104 challenges randomly to evaluate the DMOS
Arbiter PUFs with 32, 64 and 128 stages. As shown in Table
III, the uniquenesses (pˆinter) are close to the ideal value 50%.
2) Reliability and FRR
Reliability is used to evaluate the stability of PUF responses
generated by the same challenge in different environments.
Ideally, PUF responses should remain the same under same
challenges over multiple observations. Actually, a variety of
environmental conditions, such as temperature, voltage and
aging, may result in the delay differences in the PUF circuit
and cause responses to vary. Since the DMOS Arbiter PUF
obfuscates the challenge and response with the key by bitwise
XOR operation, the DMOS has no effect on the reliability.
Assume that the response Rx and Ry are generated by
the same PUF instance in different environments, and the
bit-flip rate due to environmental varies is pˆintra. For an
n-stage DMOS Arbiter PUF, the FAR is the probability of
FHD(Rx, Ry) > τ . While the probability of FHD(Rx, Ry) ≤
τ is:
P (FHD(Rx, Ry) ≤ τ) =
ntolerance∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(1−pˆintra)n−i(pˆintra)i
(26)
Therefore, the FRR can be defined as [26]:
FRR(ntolerance) =1− P (FHD(Rx, Ry) ≤ τ)
= 1−
ntolerance∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(1− pˆintra)n−i(pˆintra)i
(27)
3) Analysis of Authentication Ability
FRR decreases with the increasing of ntolerance, while FAR
increases with the increasing of ntolerance. High FAR or FRR
is undesirable for device authentication. Therefore, we hope
that the FAR and FRR can maintain balance. Assume there is
a ntolerance that makes the FAR and FRR equal, we call this
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error rate as equal error rate (EER). In this case, ntolerance can
be denoted by nEER. However, for discrete distributions, there
may not be a value that makes FAR and FRR exactly equal.
Therefore, nEER and EER [25] can be defined as follows.
nEER = argmin{max{FAR(ntolerance), FRR(ntolerance)}}
(28)
EER = max{FAR(nEER), FRR(nEER)} (29)
In the experiment, nEER and EER are computed with
the 32, 64 and 128-stage, respectively. pˆinter and pˆintra are
measured by the DMOS Arbiter PUF data.
As shown in Table III, for the 32×32 DMOS Arbiter PUF,
FAR is closest to FRR when nEER = 6. In this case, EER
is 8.7 × 10−4, which is higher than the standard of 10−6
(the required identification performance of an identification
system is determined by its application, but for most practical
applications a FAR and FRR both ≤ 10−6, and hence an EER
≤ 10−6, is minimally desired [25]). For the 64×64 DMOS
Arbiter PUF, FAR is closest to FRR when nEER = 13. In
this case, EER is 1.7 ×10−6, which meets the standard in
practical applications. For the 128×128 DMOS Arbiter PUF,
FAR is closest to FRR when nEER = 27. In this case, the EER
value is 8.9×10−11 which can be applied in practice well.
VI. COMPARISONS
In this section, we compare the DMOS PUF with the
Controlled-PUF [14], PUF-FSM [15] and Slender PUF [16]
to evaluate hardware overhead and security.
A. Hardware Overhead Comparison
As shown in Fig. 9(a), the Controlled PUF [14] adds the
two hash circuits to obfuscate both the challenge and response,
which requires an error correction code (ECC) to correct the
unstable PUF responses. However, the hash circuit will incur
high hardware overhead, and the ECC unit is also expensive
and the hardware overhead is exponentially related to the
number of error correction bits, which make the PUF difficult
to be applied to resource-constrained devices.
As shown in Fig. 9(b), based on the Controlled PUF, the
PUF-FSM [15] removes the hash circuit on the challenge side
and replaces the ECC unit with the FSM state conversion
structure at the response side to reduce the hardware overhead.
However, the hash circuit on the response side still consumes
considerable hardware resources. Additionally, the PUF-FSM
protocol requires transferring more than 160×64 = 10240
challenge bits [19], which is more expensive than storing or
transferring the helper data of a fuzzy extractor [39].
As shown in Fig. 9(c), the hardware overhead of Slender
PUF [16] consists of 4 parallel 128-stage Arbiter PUFs,
TRNG, FIFO, LFSR and control logic. The TRNG in PUF
chip generates a nonce noncep first. Then, combining with
the nonce noncev received from the server, a random seed
is generated by concatenating noncep and noncev . The gen-
erated seed is used by a pseudo-random number generator
(PRNG) to output the challenge C which will be input to
the PUF. At last, Slender PUF will select a sub-sequence W
of the response randomly and pad it with a random binary
string to create a bitstream PW of the response length for
authentication. However, 4 parallel Arbiter PUFs and related
circuits still consume considerable hardware overhead.
As shown in Fig. 9(d), the hardware overhead of DMOS
includes the XOR logic, TRNG and NVM. XOR logic for
obfuscation and HD detection consumes 75 LUTs and 46
DFFs. TRNG is used to select a key from set K randomly
to obfuscate the challenge and response. Many TRNG have
been implemented on FPGAs [40], [41]. For example, flip-
flop meta-stability-based TRNG [41] consumes 128 LUTs and
1 DFF on Artix-7 FPGA chips. Nevertheless, the additional
hardware overhead incurred by TRNG can be avoided in
practical application: 1) the TRNG has been used in many
systems and hence can be reused; 2) the metastable PUF
responses in Arbiter PUFs can be used as the random number
[42].
In order to further demonstrate the low overhead of our pro-
posed DMOS, we compare the DMOS with recent obfuscation
methods [14], [15], [16]. Based on a 128-stage Arbiter PUF
implemented on the Xilinx Artix-7 FPGA chips, the resources
(LUT, DFF and RAM) consumed by these different structures
are summarized in Table IV. A 128-stage DMOS Arbiter PUF
consumes only 395 LUTs and 176 flip-flops, the required
NVM is about 23×64×64 bits = 4KB when m = 8. Therefore,
the hardware overhead of DMOS is much smaller than other
obfuscation structures.
B. Security Comparison
For the Controlled PUF [14], the original challenge and
response of Arbiter PUF are input to the hash circuit to be
encrypted. Therefore, attackers cannot get the original CRPs
to model it. However, the unreliability of the response can be
exploited to break the Controlled PUF [12], [30]. Besides, the
usage of helper data also makes the Controlled PUF vulnerable
to the ES attack [18], [22], [23].
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TABLE III
PERFORMANCE OF DMOS ARBITER PUF
#row Pˆinter Pˆintra n nEER FAR FRR EER
#1 50.1% 5.0% 32 6 2.6×10−4 2.6×10−4 8.7×10−4
#2 49.8% 4.8% 64 13 1.1×10−6 1.7×10−6 1.7×10−6
#3 49.7% 5.2% 128 27 2.3×10−11 8.9×10−11 8.9×10−11
TABLE IV
HARDWARE OVERHEAD COMPARISON WITH METHODS [14]–[16]
Type #LUT #DFF RAM
Controlled PUF [14] 1830 3020 N/A
Slender PUF [16] 1168 1400 4KB
PUF-FSM [15] 960 1500 N/A
Our proposed DMOS 395 176 4KB
TABLE V
SECURITY COMPARISON WITH METHODS [14], [15], [16]
Type LR, SVMANN, CNN CMA-ES
Reliability-based
modeling attacks
Controlled PUF [14] × √ √
Slender PUF [16] × √ ×
PUF-FSM [15] × √ √
Our proposed
DMOS-PUF × × ×
Compared with the Controlled PUF, the hash circuit on
challenge side is removed in PUF-FSM [15]. However, the
latest research [19] proves that if attackers design the fitness
function according to the output reliability information of the
challenge and perform minimal changes to its open-source
implementation in Matlab [20], the CMA-ES can break the
PUF-FSM successfully.
For the Slender PUF [16], it is impossible for attackers to
guess a substring W by guessing the indices ind1 and ind2.
However, instead of guessing the indices to get effective CRPs,
attackers can use the strings PW or W directly as the inputs to
conduct the CMA-ES-based ML attack. Therefore, the CMA-
ES can break the Slender PUF successfully [18].
For our proposed DMOS PUF, challenges and responses are
obfuscated by the randomly selected key with the bitwise XOR
operation. The reliability of strong PUF will not be reduced.
In addition, as analyzed in Section IV.E.4), attackers do not
know which response is corresponding to the input challenge
and hence it is difficult to conduct reliability-based modeling
attacks on DMOS-PUF. Moreover, with the dynamic update
of obfuscation keys, potential ML attacks including advanced
ML attacks such as CMA-ES can be prevented. As shown
in Table V, DMOS has the obvious advantage in resisting
machine leaning attacks.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a new obfuscation technique for
strong PUFs, named dynamic multi-key-selection obfuscation
structure. In the DMOS, a true random number generator
is used to select any two keys from the key set which
is derived from the strong PUF’s own stable responses to
obfuscate challenges and responses respectively with the XOR
operation to prevent attackers from collecting effective CRPs
to perform ML attacks. With the dynamic key-updating, the
DMOS PUF is immune to all ML attacks. In addition, the
usage of self-stable CRPs incurs low hardware overhead and
the obfuscation structure does not reduce the reliability of
strong PUFs. Experimental results demonstrate its advantages
of strong resistance to ML attacks and low hardware overhead.
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